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Artificial Intelligence as a Dual-use 
Technology
Éva AMBRUS1
The aim of this article is to give an overview of the state of artificial intelligence 
regarding malware attacks, its uses in the military and views regarding if it should be 
classified as a dual-use technology. As an emerging technology, with a wide variety 
of use and capabilities, more could be done to overview its uses, and some form 
of control over it. While the classical exports control might be counterproductive, 
a more closed approach towards critical information dissemination might be 
advisable until the full range of capabilities of artificial intelligence will be known.
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Introduction
The security paradigm is changing. Until a new definition comes forward, policy-makers, 
academia and users will debate its nature and possible effects. Asymmetrical warfare, 
hybrid warfare, ‘grey area’ warfare, (dis)information warfare, unpeace are just a few 
names used trying to pinpoint the development of (IT) technology on security. Warfare and 
security includes more and more cyberspace, including cyber weapons, cyber espionage 
and cybersecurity. One driver of this change is the advances made in the last decade 
regarding artificial intelligence (AI). In this article I will present the idea that AI should 
be classified as a dual-use technology, meaning that it can be used for both civilian and 
military applications. I will start with presenting where AI weapons are today, followed by 
the nature of the relationship between state and technology. I will then present a case for 
thinking about AI as a dual-use technology.
AI as a weapon
Writing an article about artificial intelligence and its uses can leave one with more questions 
than answers. And as the ‘grey area’ warfare, or this era of ‘unpeace’, even questions have 
a high complexity. With these in mind, my aim with this article is to shed light to some of 
the questions asked today regarding the malign use of artificial intelligence. There is little 
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question that AI will make cyber warfare more powerful, increasing its scale, speed and 
power. Merriam-Webster defines artificial intelligence as: (1) a branch of computer science 
dealing with the simulation of intelligent behaviour in computers; and (2) the capability of 
a machine to imitate intelligent human behaviour.2 Although this encompasses the basic 
notion, it is still not a complete definition. This lack of certainty also comes from the notion 
of intelligence. What is intelligence? In case of AI, science has focused on different aspects, 
such as learning, reasoning, problem solving, perception, language and many others. 
Another approach is to focus on the goals and aims of AI. This is the notion put forward by 
Russel and Norvig, as well. There is no agreed definition of artificial intelligence. Russel 
and Norvig summarised the four main schools of thoughts as AI in the following way: (1) 
thinking humanly; (2) thinking rationally; (3) acting humanly; and (4) acting rationally.3 
For this article, I will use the  4th approach, defining AI as a system that acts rationally, thus 
AI can be called a rational agent. ‘A rational agent is one that does the right thing’,4 the ‘right 
thing’ being the most successful outcome for the agent (in this case, AI).
A branch of AI is machine learning. Machine learning refers to the ability of a computer 
to learn using large sets of data (not just predefined rule sets).5 Machine learning can 
basically be supervised, reinforced or unsupervised. In supervised learning, the machine 
is trained to perform a specific task, such as recognising cats in pictures. For it to learn to 
distinguish this, it needs large amounts of tagged data, and this also includes checking the 
correct answers. Supervised training is used for tasks requiring information classification 
(for example filtering spam messages). Reinforced learning is giving direct feedback to 
the autonomous system about its output (for example did it classify correctly). In case of 
unsupervised learning, the program is not assigned any task and the data is unlabelled, so it 
is free to find its own correlations in the data. Learning from the data, the machine creates 
clusters in the given data and sets association rules that combine the various variables in the 
data. In cybersecurity, this can be the detection of malware.
An interesting part regarding machine learning and adaptability in the concepts of 
the human-in-the-loop (HITL). Basically, it combines human and artificial intelligence 
to create machine learning models with humans directly involved in training, tuning and 
testing the data. It is understood that HITL is important in cases when the cost of error is too 
high, when the ML algorithm cannot have any margin of error.6 This would be the case in 
any military application, but also for autonomous driving. Literature distinguishes between 
human-in-the-loop, human-on-the-loop and human-off-the-loop. In the first case (HITL), 
the human has the final say in the execution of the lethal force (for example drones). In the 
second case, the decision can be made without the human operator, but the operator can 
override it. In the third scenario, the human operator cannot override the weapon system’s 
triggering mechanism, so there is no human intervention possible.7
2 ‘Artificial intelligence’, Merriam-Webster dictionary.
3 Stuart J Russell and Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence. A Modern Approach (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 
 2010),  2.
4 Russell and Norvig, Artificial Intelligence,  4.
5 ‘Machine learning’, Dictionary.com.
6 Mothi Venkatesh, ‘What is Human-in-the-Loop for Machine Learning?’, Hackernoon.com, July  17,  2018.
7 Seumas Miller, Dual Use Science and Technology, Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Springer 
International Publishing,  2018),  100.
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Reviewing the literature, it seems generally believed that an antivirus system with 
artificial intelligence and machine learning is the solution to modern malware attacks.8 
Malware can be defined as unwanted software which performs non-benign operations 
on any system. Avi Pfeifer et al. gave two insights into malwares. The first is that like 
biological viruses, they are rarely de novo; malwares are re-used to avoid detection and 
hide similarities. Secondly, regarding the functioning of malwares, it is harder to obfuscate 
what it does try to accomplish than how it wants to do it – it leaves a trace. It can be seen 
from these analogies, that malwares are changing fast, and the adaptability of AI and ML 
needs to be high.9
Adaptability faces at least two challenges: costs and adversarial attack. As we have 
seen, for ML to work well, it needs data (either labelled or unlabelled) to learn from. If the 
task is that it is trained for changes day-by-day, it means that it needs continuous training 
to be able to differentiate between benign or non-benign software. The second challenge, 
adversarial attack refers to the tactic of ‘poisoning the well’, or in this case, the training 
data sets. Recent research shows that deep learning is sensitive to contrasting, contradictory 
examples where the opponent can manipulate the input of the deep learning model in such 
a discreet way by adding minimal disruption to the input material to produce the desired 
result, that is, misclassification.
Its structure is due to the system of so-called neural networks. Neural networks are made 
up of elementary computing units – so-called neurons, which form interconnected layers. 
Each neuron applies an activation function to its input to create a specific output. Starting 
with model input, each network layer produces an output that the next layer uses as input. 
Networks with a single intermediate layer – hidden – are considered shallow neural networks, 
while models with multiple hidden layers are deep neural networks. They are sensitive to 
the manipulation of opposite examples of their inputs. ‘Adversarial examples are inputs to 
a classifier specifically crafted to deceive the model, causing misclassification’.10 Training 
models developed based on real and simulated data may be significantly more secure, but its 
development can come with a higher cost. One solution to this is counter-narrator training,11 
which is to improve the model’s generalisation ability, that is, the prediction of patterns 
outside the learner’s data set. Good generalisation also generally makes the classification 
less sensitive to minor disturbances and therefore, more resistant to conflicting examples.
Cybersecurity is often thought as passive, meaning the systems are waiting for the 
attack and all AI can do is help detect, categorise and respond to the attack.12 AI-enhanced 
cyber weapons will have wider scope and greater speed than today’s adversarial AI. One 
of the threats of the future would be that these AI-enabled tools would enable, for example 
8 Sherif Saad, William Briguglio and Haytham Elmiligi, ‘The Curious Case of Machine Learning in Malware 
Detection’, Arxiv.org, May  18,  2019.
9 Avi Pfeffer, Brian E Ruttenberg, Lee Kellogg, Michael Howard, Catherine Call, Alison M O’Connor, Glenn 
Takata, Scott Neal Reilly, Terry Patten, Jason Taylor, Robert Hall, Arun Lakhotia, Craig Miles, Daniel Scofield 
and Jared Frank, ‘Artificial Intelligence Based Malware Analysis’, Arxiv.org, April  27,  2017.
10 Nuno Martins, José Magalhães Cruz, Tiago Cruz and Pedro Henriques Abreu, ‘Adversarial Machine Learning 
Applied to Intrusion and Malware Scenarios: A Systematic Review’, IEEE Access  8 (2020),  35417.
11 Christian Szegedy, Vincent Vanhoucke, Sergey Ioffe, Jonathon Shlens and Zbigniew Wojna, ‘Rethinking the 
Inception Architecture for Computer Vision’, CVPR (2016),  2818–2826.
12 Anna L Buczak and Erhan Guven, ‘A Survey of Data Mining and Machine Learning Methods for Cyber Security 
Intrusion Detection’, IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials  18, no  2 (2016),  1153–1176.
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‘data-poisoning’. Data poisoning attacks are attacks when ‘malicious users inject false 
training data with the aim of corrupting the learned model’.13 As we have seen machine 
learning depends on datasets, and tampering with the input data to divert its results would 
mean it is at best underperforming, undetectably. The time for the human-in-the-loop to 
detect such functioning anomaly is essential, especially as more and more systems can 
(and will) become autonomous. Adaptability on the defence side faces more constraint than 
on the attackers’ side. Some of these factors are financial (costs), personnel (retraining), 
performance (should not degrade system performance), usability and manageability, 
operations (fitting into the security operation), design (built-in preferred), perception (of the 
usefulness of defensive technology).14
Dual-use technology
There are valid concerns about the increase of autonomy of weapons system, and ethical 
questions are raised. Non-governmental organisations like International Committee for 
Robot Arms Control would limit the research and development of AI to civilian use only. 
On the other hand, these technologies are already being developed and tested. Large scale 
deployment will not happen until the margin of error of these systems will be close to zero, 
thus the importance of the mentioned human-in-the-loop in the process. But it is imaginable 
that in the future these autonomous systems will be more accurate than humans, thus new 
ethical questions will be raised.
Artificial intelligence and its uses in attacks or defences are emerging technologies. 
Emerging technologies can be described as ‘technologies that have disruptive potential but 
have not yet been developed to their fullest potential’.15 AI throughout its history had several 
‘growth’ periods, when technological advances made it possible to develop it further. Its full 
scope of practical uses still cannot be determined and it is used in both military and civilian 
industry. In theory, there is the possibility of misuse by different actors. One can argue, that 
most technology can be used for more than one purpose, but the term ‘dual-use’ is reserved 
for technology that has a significant government application (and thus pertains to national 
security) and a private sector application, as well. At one point PlayStation  2 was briefly 
considered a dual-use technology by Japan.16
Gregory Lewis et al. in their article present the case of information hazard in 
biotechnology. Their view is that both openness and secrecy of information may backfire. 
They suggest ‘that mitigation of these hazards can be improved if one can: (1) anticipate 
hazard potential before scientific work is performed; (2) consider how much the new 
13 Jacob Steinhardt, Pang Wei Koh and Percy Liang, ‘Certified Defenses for Data Poisoning Attacks’, Arxiv.org, 
November  24,  2017.
14 Sean M Price, ‘Adaptive threats and defences’, in Information Security Management Handbook, vol.  4, ed. by 
Harold F Tipton and Micki Krause (Auerbach Publications,  2019),  44–45.
15 Daniele Rotolo, Diana Hicks and Ben R Martin, ‘What Is an Emerging Technology?’, Arxiv.org, January  4, 
 2016,  4.
16 Associated Press, ‘Sony’s High-Tech Playstation2 Will Require Military Export License’, Los Angeles Times, 
April  17,  2000.
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information would likely help both good and bad actors; and (3) aim to disclose information 
in the manner that maximally disadvantages bad actors versus good ones’.17
As per the EU’s definition ‘dual-use items are goods, software and technology that can 
be used for both civilian and military applications’.18 We have seen the definition in the EU, 
but for its research and development programme, ‘Horizon  2020, is more specific, requiring 
applicants for funding to ensure that “research and innovation activities carried out under 
Horizon  2020 shall have an exclusive focus on civil applications,” and they are required to 
complete an ethics checklist to demonstrate that they comply with this requirement’.19
AI systems and their design knowledge can be used for both civilian and military 
applications, and more broadly for beneficial and harmful purposes. Artificial intelligence 
is dual-use in the same sense as human intelligence. Many of the tasks that would be useful 
to automate are themselves dual-use. For example, software vulnerability detection systems 
have both offensive and defensive applications, and there is little difference between 
the capabilities of an autonomous drone used to transport packages and an autonomous 
drone used to transport explosives. In addition, basic research aimed at understanding AI, 
enhancing its abilities and controlling it is inherently dual-use. Machine learning (and 
AI) is a fairly open field, where researchers share details about their models and codes on 
the internet, as well. Hagendorff introduces the notion of ‘forbidden knowledge’, which 
is akin to Bostrom’s ‘information hazard’. While the latter is ‘a risk that arises from the 
dissemination or the potential dissemination of (true) information that may cause harm or 
enable some agents to cause harm’,20 while the former is defined as (scientific) knowledge 
that is too dangerous to be disseminated unrestrictedly, for example in the fields of IT 
security or synthetic biology.21
One of the trends is the increase of existing threats. The cost of attacks is decreasing 
with the spread of AI to perform tasks that generally require human work, intelligence and 
expertise. As a result, the range of actors capable of carrying out certain attacks, the speed 
at which the attacks are executed and the set of potential targets will increase. An emerging 
threat of using AI systems to perform tasks that are virtually unmanageable by humans is 
the fact that attackers can exploit vulnerabilities in AI systems. The typical nature of threats 
is changing. With the increasing use of AI, attacks will become more effective, highly 
targeted, difficult to associate with a perpetrator, and are likely to exploit vulnerabilities in 
AI systems. Cybersecurity is an area that takes early and enthusiastic advantage of AI. The 
adaptability of AI systems can also change the strategic environment of cybersecurity, the 
attack/defence balance. The systems currently in use are quite effective against typical 
human-made malware, and research has already shown that AI systems will soon be able to 
circumvent their protection.
17 Gregory Lewis, Piers Millett, Anders Sandberg, Andrew Snyder‐Beattie and Gigi Gronvall, ‘Information 
Hazards in Biotechnology’, Risk Analysis  39, no  5 (2019),  1.
18 European Commission, ‘Dual-use trade controls’.
19 Tara Mahfoud, Christine Aicardi, Saheli Datta and Nikolas Rose, ‘The Limits of Dual Use’, Issues in Science 
and Technology  34, no  4 (2018).
20 Nick Bostrom, ‘Information Hazards: A Typology of Potential Harms from Knowledge’, Review of 
Contemporary Philosophy  10 (2011),  45.
21 Thilo Hagendorff, ‘Forbidden knowledge in machine learning. Reflections on the limits of research and 
publication’, Arxiv.org, November  2019,  3.
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Trends
Attitudes of society might change regarding AI as the coming generations are more and 
more confident in it. As with other technologies before, it may not be possible to clearly 
separate the civilian and military uses of it. Like the dual-faced God Janus, many of our 
everyday technology can be used for both purposes. We have to accept the fact that this 
technology will be used by actors for harm and prepare for it.
Carrick Flynn wrote a brief issue on the export control of artificial intelligence. His 
findings (regarding the state of play in the United States) are summarised in four main 
points:
(1) New export control regulations on general purpose AI software, untrained algorithms, 
and datasets without military use are unlikely to succeed and should not be 
implemented.
(2) Highly application-specific AI software, trained algorithms, and militarily sensitive 
data sets are useful targets for export control, but are already covered by the current 
export control regime.
(3) Equipment for manufacturing AI chips is likely a highly effective point of export 
control.
(4) The effectiveness of export controls on AI chips will depend on early implementation 
of export controls on chip manufacturing equipment. AI chips themselves are not yet 
a promising target for expanded regulation. 
Per his findings, the (3) option could be a next step in export control regulation. In his view: 
‘The computing power required for AI increasingly relies on specialized microprocessors 
(AI chips) optimized for AI applications. AI chips are produced using highly advanced 
semiconductor manufacturing equipment that is relatively easy to define, monitor, track, 
and control.’22
New export control (option  1) would go against the fact that at this point innovation in 
AI relies on openness in the field, thus could harm research, as well as damaging relations 
between governments and the industry.
AI is becoming an important factor in maintaining the economic and national security 
of most countries, but as new technologies develop, so should new tools to address them. 
In the  20th century, one way of maintaining technological superiority was through export 
controls. Export controls are a web of regulations that prohibit the transfer of certain 
commodities or information, motivated by national security concerns or trade objectives, or 
both. Effectiveness of such measures in a globalised value-chain world remains dubious, as 
it needs to balance research and development needs (which thrive in an open environment) 
as well the interests of multinational technological corporations, allied countries and 
scientists.23
Norms prevailing in the AI research community show a strong tendency towards 
openness. Most new research is published online, often sharing all the information from 
22 Carrick Flynn, ‘Recommendations on Export Controls for Artificial Intelligence’, Centre for Security and 
Emerging Technology, February  2020.
23 Jade Leung, Sophie-Charlotte Fischer and Allan Dafoe, ‘Export controls in the age of AI’, War on the Rocks, 
August  28,  2019.
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the outline, through the algorithmic details to the source code. This level of openness has 
clear benefits in enabling researchers to rely on each other’s work, fostering collaboration. 
Rather, it is a thought-provoking idea of what solutions may be needed when it comes to 
moving away from openness for security reasons. Should a risk assessment be conducted 
before publishing in detail AI attacks that can be used for attack? This is the norm, for 
example, in the field of biotechnology. Or would it be too early for this measure to await 
its widespread adoption, assessing which technical research is most important for safety? 
Should a community be established in which certain types of research results can be 
selectively shared among a predetermined set of criteria that meet certain criteria, such as 
effective information security and appropriate ethical standards? What can be learned from 
other models of dual-use technology sharing?
AI in the military
Regarding the uses of artificial intelligence in the military, one of the areas concerned 
is about decision-making.24 The use of AI in analysis, classification is already in use (for 
example in the automotive industry) and will help decision-makers ‘by providing easy-
to-understand analysis and recommendations based on big data25’. The question of control 
in the military is especially important, although most articles underline that humans will 
remain the final decision-makers. Scott D Sagan explores the connection between ethics, 
technology and war. In his view, new technologies could reduce collateral damage, but also 
lower the political cost of engagement, thus more conflicts would emerge.26 This is a trend 
seen in the ‘grey area’ conflicts, like cyber weapons. Artificial intelligence is changing 
the nature and principles of warfare by making decision-making cycles faster, advantages 
provided by AI will be for those that can apply AI in the broadest sense, and thus a revision 
of concepts regarding the organisation, control and command of military forces will be 
needed.27
Another distinction that can be made is that technology shapes warfare, the conduct of 
war. This distinction is important because more and more violence nowadays is not confined 
to a precise geographic area, and the opponents are also not clearly defined. Grasping a new 
definition of conflict, or extending its definition poses a problem. And with the rise of new 
technologies, an erosion of the state’s monopoly over the use of force, combined with the 
proliferation of new technologies to non-state actors poses a new threat. On the other hand, 
wars are costly enterprises, even this new era of unpeace. As Sterling Pavelec notes, ‘modern 
military technology is costly, founded by government resources and will require massive 
amounts of funding, brainpower, and a society that is willing and capable of technological 
evolution’.28
24 Gordon Cooke, ‘Magic Bullets: The Future of Artificial Intelligence in Weapons Systems’, Army.mil, June  11, 
 2019.
25 Cooke, ‘Magic Bullets’. 
26 Scott D Sagan, ‘Ethics, Technology and War’, Daedalus  145, no  4 (2016),  6–11.
27 Imre Porkoláb and Imre Négyesi, ‘A mesterséges intelligencia alkalmazási lehetőségeinek kutatása a haderőben’, 
Honvédségi Szemle  147, no  5 (2019),  17.
28 Sterling M Pavelec, War and Warfare since  1945 (Routledge,  2017),  156.
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‘War made the state and state made the war’ is a famous saying, and technology can 
help or hinder both. After the Second World War, theorists talk about postmodern warfare 
as it became less physical; states could reach their aims below the threshold of war. 
Technological arms race persists today: we face uncertainty, complexity and over-reliance 
on technology. Alex Roland argues in his essay, that ‘technology is like an “open door”, 
as it adds what most accounts of technological innovation lack: human agency. Humans 
must decide if they are going to, or can, take up a given military innovation. And they 
must adapt it to their circumstances. Technology is a possibility, not an imperative’.29 As 
the emerging and developing technologies raise new questions about ethics, morals and 
legality, it is important to notice that although the door is opening, we have not yet passed 
through it. As Feldman et al. wrote, ‘context is critical: training exercises may look like 
war, but they are actually between allies; cold war may look like peace, but it isn’t exactly. 
Any intelligent system (human, human/machine, or machine) must be aware of these and 
other complicating concerns’.30
Regarding the use of AI and ML in the military, in a recently published article James 
Johnson argues that ‘the fusion of AI machine learning and human judgment to gauge an 
adversary’s intentions (and predict escalation) for the purposes of planning and directing 
future wars for the pursuit of political objectives, is, therefore, a far less unlikely prospect 
in the near future than the use of AI to achieve tactical and operational ends (e.g. drone 
swarming and cyber defence)’.31 The connection between war and technology is undeniable, 
but their logic differ on a fundamental level – ‘technology perceives the universe as 
functioning rationally and predictably, while in war no success is possible which is not 
grounded in an ability to tolerate uncertainty, cope with it and make use of’.32
Conclusion
In this article I have attempted to give an overview of the main points regarding artificial 
intelligences’ adversarial use, its place in the military and the questions regarding dual-use 
technology distinction. The development of new technologies raises the question of its uses, 
and in the case of AI, more so are questions of ethical nature. As yet it is an emerging 
technology, its full capabilities are hard to predict, but it is my view that erring on the 
side of caution would be preferable. Understanding that a technological race might unfold, 
a limited dissemination of information could be one of the possible solutions until we are 
aware of all possibilities that artificial intelligence may provide. Finally, at one point it 
would be advisable to have a distinction between military-level and civilian-level AI, either 
through capabilities, aims or by other criteria.
29 Alex Roland, ‘War and Technology’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, February  27,  2009.
30 Philip Feldman, Aaron Dant and Aaron Massey, ‘Integrating Artificial Intelligence into Weapon Systems’, 
Arxiv.org, May  10,  2019.
31 James Johnson, ‘The AI-cyber nexus: implications for military escalation, deterrence and strategic stability’, 
Journal of Cyber Policy  4, no  3 (2019).
32 Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: From  2000 B.C. to the Present (New York: The Free Press,  1991), 
 316.
É. AMBRUS: Artificial Intelligence as a Dual-use Technology
AARMS (19) 2 (2020) 27
References
‘Artificial intelligence’, Merriam-Webster dictionary. Online: www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/artificial%20intelligence
Associated Press, ‘Sony’s High-Tech Playstation2 Will Require Military Export License’. Los 
Angeles Times,  17 April  2000. Online: www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-apr-17-fi-
20482-story.html
Bostrom, Nick, ‘Information Hazards: A Typology of Potential Harms from Knowledge’. Review 
of Contemporary Philosophy  10 (2011),  44–79.
Buczak, Anna L and Erhan Guven, ‘A Survey of Data Mining and Machine Learning Methods 
for Cyber Security Intrusion Detection’. IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials  18, no 
 2 (2016),  1153–1176. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/comst.2015.2494502
Cooke, Gordon, ‘Magic Bullets: The Future of Artificial Intelligence in Weapons Systems’. Army.
mil,  11 June  2019. Online: www.army.mil/article/223026/magic_bullets_the_future_of_
artificial_intelligence_in_weapons_systems
European Commission, ‘Dual-use trade controls’. Online: https://ec.europa.eu/trade/import-and-
export-rules/export-from-eu/dual-use-controls/
Feldman, Philip, Aaron Dant and Aaron Massey, ‘Integrating Artificial Intelligence into Weapon 
Systems’, Arxiv.org,  10 May  2019. Online: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.03899.pdf
Flynn, Carrick, ‘Recommendations on Export Controls for Artificial Intelligence’. Centre for 
Security and Emerging Technology, February  2020. Online: https://cset.georgetown.edu/
wp-content/uploads/Recommendations-on-Export-Controls-for-Artificial-Intelligence.pdf 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.51593/20190001
Hagendorff, Thilo, ‘Forbidden knowledge in machine learning. Reflections on the limits 
of research and publication’. Arxiv.org, November  2019. Online: https://arxiv.org/
pdf/1911.08603.pdf DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-020-01045-4
Johnson, James, ‘The AI-cyber nexus: implications for military escalation, deterrence and 
strategic stability’. Journal of Cyber Policy  4, no  3 (2019),  442–460. DOI: https://doi.org/10
.1080/23738871.2019.1701693
Leung, Jade, Sophie-Charlotte Fischer and Allan Dafoe, ‘Export controls in the age of AI’. War on 
the Rocks,  28 August  2019. Online: https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/export-controls-in-
the-age-of-ai/
Lewis, Gregory, Piers Millett, Anders Sandberg, Andrew Snyder‐Beattie and Gigi Gronvall, 
‘Information Hazards in Biotechnology’. Risk Analysis  39, no  5 (2019),  975–981. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.13235
‘Machine learning’, Dictionary.com. Online: www.dictionary.com/browse/machine-learning
Mahfoud, Tara, Christine Aicardi, Saheli Datta and Nikolas Rose, ‘The Limits of Dual Use’. 
Issues in Science and Technology  34, no  4 (2018). Online: https://issues.org/the-limits-of-
dual-use/
Martins, Nuno, José Magalhães Cruz, Tiago Cruz and Pedro Henriques Abreu, ‘Adversarial 
Machine Learning Applied to Intrusion and Malware Scenarios: A Systematic Review’. 
IEEE Access  8 (2020),  35403–35419. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2974752
Miller, Seumas, Dual Use Science and Technology, Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
Springer International Publishing,  2018. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92606-3
É. AMBRUS: Artificial Intelligence as a Dual-use Technology
28 AARMS (19) 2 (2020) 
Pavelec, Sterling M, War and Warfare since  1945. Routledge,  2017. DOI. https://doi.
org/10.4324/9781315175478
Pfeffer, Avi, Brian E Ruttenberg, Lee Kellogg, Michael Howard, Catherine Call, Alison M 
O’Connor, Glenn Takata, Scott Neal Reilly, Terry Patten, Jason Taylor, Robert Hall, Arun 
Lakhotia, Craig Miles, Dan Scofield and Jared Frank, ‘Artificial Intelligence Based Malware 
Analysis’. Arxiv.org,  27 April  2017. Online: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1704.08716.pdf
Porkoláb Imre and Négyesi Imre, ‘A mesterséges intelligencia alkalmazási lehetőségeinek 
kutatása a haderőben’. Honvédségi Szemle  147, no  5 (2019),  3–20.
Price, Sean M, ‘Adaptive threats and defences’, in Information Security Management Handbook, 
vol.  4, ed. by Harold F Tipton and Micki Krause. Auerbach Publications,  2019,  42–65.
Roland, Alex, ‘War and Technology’. Foreign Policy Research Institute,  27 February  2009. www.
fpri.org/article/2009/02/war-and-technology/
Rotolo, Daniele, Diana Hicks and Ben R Martin, ‘What Is an Emerging Technology?’ Arxiv.org, 
 4 January  2016. Online: https://arxiv.org/abs/1503.00673
Russell, Stuart J and Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence. A Modern Approach. New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall,  2010.
Saad, Sherif, William Briguglio and Haytham Elmiligi, ‘The Curious Case of Machine Learning 
in Malware Detection’. Arxiv.org,  18 May  2019. Online: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.07573.
pdf DOI: https://doi.org/10.5220/0007470705280535
Sagan, Scott D, ‘Ethics, Technology and War’. Daedalus  145, no  4 (2016),  6–11. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1162/daed_e_00407
Steinhardt, Jacob, Pang Wei Koh and Percy Liang, ‘Certified Defenses for Data Poisoning 
Attacks’. Arxiv.org,  24 November  2017. Online: https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.03691
Szegedy, Christian, Vincent Vanhoucke, Sergey Ioffe, Jonathon Shlens and Zbigniew 
Wojna, ‘Rethinking the Inception Architecture for Computer Vision’, CVPR (2016), 
 2818–2826. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/cvpr.2016.308
Van Creveld, Martin, Technology and War: From  2000 B.C. to the Present. New York: The Free 
Press,  1991.
Venkatesh, Mothi, ‘What is Human-in-the-Loop for Machine Learning?’ Hackernoon.com, 
 17 July  2018. Online: https://hackernoon.com/what-is-human-in-the-loop-for-machine-
learning-2c2152b6dfbb
